Should Japan Adopt a Plain Language Rule by Miyazaki, Susumu
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2004
Should Japan Adopt a Plain Language Rule
Susumu Miyazaki
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miyazaki, Susumu, "Should Japan Adopt a Plain Language Rule" (2004). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 214.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/214
Articles
Should Japan Adopt a Plain Language
Rule?*
Susumu Miyazaki'
INTRODUCTION
Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
adopted the plain English rule in 1998, if individual investors
had been asked whether they had ever read a prospectus prior
to making an investment decision, many might have answered
"no."1 Although prospectuses were then (and are still) important
as tools that provide essential information to investors, 2 the
SEC believed that, prior to adoption of the plain English rule,
lay investors did not rely on prospectuses because they were in-
comprehensible.3 Simply put, the complex and legalistic lan-
guage kept lay-individual investors away from prospectuses; the
plain English rule was codified in order to curb this tendency. 4
The question remains, however, whether the plain English rule
accomplishes its goal of furthering disclosure of information to
* The Minnesota Journal of Global Trade was unable to verify some of the sources
cited in this article. The sources were not available at the time of printing.
** I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Randall Thomas, my advisor, for
his excellent guidance and support throughout my LL.M. program at Vanderbilt
University Law School. Discussions with him inspired me and encouraged my re-
search. I greatly appreciate the efforts of Kyle Wermerskirchen, Jennifer Opheim
Whitener and other editors at the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade. I also appre-
ciate proofreading assistance from Nancy Calonge, research assistance by Stephen
Jordan, and support from Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. Finally, I would like to
thank my wife Aya, my son Shohei, and all of my family for their love and support.
1. See World Accounting Report, THE FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at 1.
2. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 4
(3d ed. 2001).
3. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 15 (1979).
4. Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998).
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lay investors, or whether there are ways to better achieve that
goal. The purpose of this article is to examine precisely that
question. Specifically, this article aims to demonstrate that the
Japanese version of the plain English rule (the plain language
rule) offers added investor protection by working together with
other Japanese laws, and that the plain language rule alone
does not sufficiently protect lay investors.
This article will accomplish this task by first discussing the
historical background, structures, strengths and shortcomings of
the plain English doctrine. This article will then outline Japan's
current situation and its regulation regarding disclosure as an
alternative solution. Finally, this article will discuss the new
movement to introduce a plain language doctrine in Japan and
the effects of the combination of current regulation and the
plain language rule on the financial system.
I. PLAIN ENGLISH DOCTRINE
A. BACKGROUND
A prospectus is a document that details the nature, pur-
pose, and risks of a security. 5 Through prospectuses, investors
can achieve an understanding of their investment targets; thus,
prospectuses are extremely important for investment decisions. 6
However, because of the technical terms traditionally used to
write a prospectus, detailed prospectuses tend to be too difficult
for lay-individual investors. 7 In order to narrow the gap be-
tween disclosure requirements and the need for clear, under-
standable prospectuses, the SEC devised and adopted the plain
English rule in 1998.8
The plain English doctrine is not a new concept in the legal
world.9 Beginning with guidelines published in the mid 1940s
5. Generally, a prospectus is defined as "[a] printed document that describes
the main features of an enterprise ... and that is distributed to prospective buyers
or investors; esp., a written description of a securities offering." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1238 (7th ed. 1999).
6. See COX ETAL., supra note 2, at 5.
7. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998).
8. The proposed plain English rule was released by the SEC on January 21,
1997. Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152 (Jan. 21, 1997). On January 22,
1998, the Plain English Rule was codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.421.
9. Andrew T. Serafin, Kicking the Legalese Habit: The SECs "Plain English
Disclosure" Proposal, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 683 (1998); see also Michael G. Byers,
Eschew Obfuscation-The Merit of the SEC's Plain English Doctrine, 31 U. MEM. L.
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that were intended to make writing more understandable, 10 the
preference for expression in simple, ordinary, and plain lan-
guage began to take root.11
B. HISTORY OF THE PLAIN ENGLISH DOCTRINE
Rudolph Flesch was one of the first intellectuals who pro-
moted the importance of clear, understandable writing.12 In
1946, Flesch published The Art of Plain Talk, and advocated
that all types of writing should be clear and readable. 13 He de-
vised both quantitative and qualitative formulas to measure
readability, and insisted that writers consider the differences in
ability to understand among readers due to their diverse back-
grounds. 14
The plain English doctrine began to be used during the
1950s, but was not widely applied to many types of legal writing
until the 1960s.15 In 1963, for instance, David Mellinkoff sug-
gested ways to clarify "wordy," "unclear," "pompous," and "dull"
legalese.' 6 In the 1970s, insurance policies written in compli-
cated legalese led to significant social problems, a fact that fur-
ther contributed to the use of plain English in legal writing.17
During this period, consumer movements pushed for readable
and understandable legal documents.' 8 As a result of these
movements, President Carter issued an executive order and be-
came the first President to require that government regulations
be written in plain English.' 9
REV. 135, 138 (2000).
10. See generally RUDOLF FLESCH, THE ART OF PLAIN TALK (1946).
11. Id. at2.
12. See Serafin, supra note 9, at 683.
13. See FLESCH, supra note 10, at 1.
14. RUDOLF FLESCH, THE ART OF READABLE WRITING 147-56 (1949); see also
FLESCH, supra note 10, at xii. This formula determined readability with such quan-
titative elements as fewer words per sentence and fewer syllables per word.
FLESCH, supra note 10, at 105. Flesch also devised a qualitative formula. Id.
Flesch recommended that writers not use "rhythm," "periodic sentences," "rhetorical
questions," "metaphors without an explanation," "contrasts without an explanation,"
or "irony." Id.
15. See Serafin, supra note 9, at 686-87.
16. Id. at 686 (citing DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 24
(1963)).
17. See Kenneth B. Firtel, Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audi-
ence of Disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 852
(1999). More than half of the states now have statutes which require insurance
companies to simplify the language of their policies. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (referring to Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978)).
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C. THE SEC's VIEW OF DISCLOSURE
The SEC is of the opinion that one of the best ways to pro-
tect every investor is full disclosure of information. 20 The Secu-
rities Act of 1933, which regulates the SEC, arose as a result of
securities fraud in the 1920s that was partially caused by mis-
leading information and insufficient disclosure. 21 One of the ob-
jectives of this Act was to enable all investors to read and un-
derstand the prospectuses of their investment instruments and,
thereby, to understand all material information about the is-
suer. 22 However, this expectation was far from realized, and the
gap between difficulty of prospectuses and comprehension by
lay-individual investors remained.23
D. THE SEC AND THE PLAIN ENGLISH RULE
In the early 1990s, the SEC began to develop the plain Eng-
lish rule, but steps toward introducing this rule were not actu-
ally taken until 1996, when Arthur Levitt became chairman of
the SEC.24 Levitt's belief in the importance of investor educa-
tion led to the introduction of the plain English rule.25 In 1996,
the SEC started a pilot program in which public companies used
plain English for two disclosure documents: a mutual fund pro-
spectus and a joint proxy statement. 26 This pilot program was a
success. In particular, Bell Atlantic's experience demonstrated
that even large companies listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change could successfully write documents in plain English. 27
This success promoted the utility of the plain English rule. 28
In 1995, under Levitt's lead, the SEC established a task
force to incorporate the principles of the plain English doctrine
20. Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152 (Jan. 21, 1997).
21. See COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 3-4.
22. Id. at 5.
23. See Byers, supra note 9, at 142-44 (discussing the finding of an SEC Task
Force).
24. Id. at 141-42.
25. Id. at 142.
26. George Hathaway & Kathleen Gibson, The Word from the Securities and
Exchange Commission: Put it in Plain English, 75 MICH. Bus. L. J. 1314 (1996).
27. Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152, 3154 (Jan. 21, 1997). Bell At-
lantic is currently Verizon communications. Verizon, The History of Verizon Com-
munications, at http://investor.verizon.com/profile/history/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
Verizon Communications (NYSE: VZ), formed by the merger of Bell Atlantic and
GTE, is one of the world's leading providers of high-growth communications services.
Id.
28. See Serafin, supra note 9, at 696.
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into securities regulations. 29 This task force issued a report
which recommended changing some of the SEC's regulations re-
garding the writing of, and disclosures in, prospectuses. 30 The
SEC recognized that disclosure is not accomplished where inves-
tors lack understanding; prospectuses that contain convoluted
language and thereby frustrate investor understanding do not
provide proper disclosure. 31 The task force, therefore, recom-
mended that the SEC "develop a 'plain English' introduction to
the prospectus to enhance its readability for individual inves-
tors, eliminat[e] boilerplate 'legalese' and requireo a summary
of key information."32 As for disclosure of risk, the task force
recommended that the SEC "clarify that disclosure regarding
the risks of the offering pursuant to Item 503 of Regulation S-K
must be set forth in full in the forepart of the prospectus and
cannot be incorporated by reference from other filings or por-
tions of the document."33 The task force also recommended the
inclusion of a summary, with common questions written without
technical and legal jargon, to prevent the prospectus from be-
coming too lengthy. 34
E. ADOPTION OF THE PLAIN ENGLISH RULE
Based on the activities of the task force, the SEC released a
draft of the plain English rule in January 1997. 35 The proposal
was highly controversial in the business world. 36 In particular,
the following two concerns were typically raised by financial in-
dustries: first, using plain English made full disclosure less
complete than it had been before; and second, an issuer's litiga-
tion risk would increase.37 The SEC, citing Mellinkoff, coun-
tered the first concern in an official release: "[tihe disclosure ob-
viously must be correct, but plain English often is more precise
than the obscure and complex writing style that is prevalent in
prospectuses, [even though] legal terms like 'hereafter,' 'herein-
29. Byers, supra note 9, at 142.
30. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE
SIMPLIFICATION, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm (Mar. 5,
1996).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152 (Jan. 21, 1997).
36. See Byers, supra note 9, at 147-48.
37. Id. at 148-49.
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after,' and 'herein' may give a legal flavor to writing."38  The
SEC argued that "[f]irst, the rule proposals do not reduce the
substantive information that must be given to an investor; plain
English does not mean leaving out anything important or mate-
rial. Second, we know of no case that has held anyone liable
under Section 11 for clearly disclosing material information to
investors."39 The SEC adopted the plain English rule on Janu-
ary 22, 1998.40
F. CONTENTS OF THE PLAIN ENGLISH RULE
The plain English rule41 is composed of four sections outlin-
ing elements of clear prospectuses. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b) and
(d) give specific guidelines on how to express detailed informa-
tion, while subsections (a) and (c) discuss conceptual matters. 42
38. Id.; see also Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152, 3155 (Jan. 21,
1997).
39. See Byers, supra note 9, at 149.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (1998).
41. Id.
42. Id. This section of the regulation provides that:
(b) You must present the information in a prospectus in a clear, concise and
understandable manner. You must prepare the prospectus using the follow-
ing standards:
(1) Present information in clear, concise sections, paragraphs, and sen-
tences. Whenever possible, use short, explanatory sentences and bullet
lists;
(2) Use descriptive headings and subheadings;
(3) Avoid frequent reliance on glossaries or defined terms as the primary
means of explaining information in the prospectus. Define terms in a glos-
sary or other section of the document only if the meaning is unclear from
the context. Use a glossary only if it facilitates understanding of the dis-
closure; and
(4) Avoid legal and highly technical business terminology.
17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b). A later section provides that:
(d)(1) To enhance the readability of the prospectus, you must use plain
English principles in the organization, language, and design of the front
and back cover pages, the summary, and the risk factors section.
(2) You must draft the language in these sections so that at a minimum it
substantially complies with each of the following plain English writing
principles:
(i) Short sentences;
(ii) Definite, concrete, everyday words;
(iii) Active voice;
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The note to 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b) provides examples of inap-
propriate expressions of information. 43
In sum, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b)(1) and (2) tell issuers how to
correctly present information, and 17 C.F.R. § 421(b)(3) and (4)
and the note to 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b) show types of disclosure
that should be avoided. 44 Similarly, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)
shows the devices that make a prospectus more readable and
understandable. 45 In particular, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(2) gives
specific affirmative instruction to issuers.46 The Instructions to
17 C.F.R. § 230.421 similarly provide guidance by referring is-
suers to the "Securities Act Release No. 33-7497 for information
on plain English principles." 47 In this release, the SEC gives de-
tailed information about how to write a prospectus using 17
C.F.R. § 230.421(d).48 According to this section, an issuer must
"prepare the front portion of the prospectus in plain English"
and "use plain English principles in the organization, language,
(iv) Tabular presentation or bullet lists for complex material, whenever
possible;
(v) No legal jargon or highly technical business terms; and
(vi) No multiple negatives.
(3) In designing these sections or other sections of the prospectus, you may
include pictures, logos, charts, graphs, or other design elements so long as
the design is not misleading and the required information is clear. You are
encouraged to use tables, schedules, charts and graphic illustrations of the
results of operations, balance sheet, or other financial data that present the
data in an understandable manner. Any presentation must be consistent
with the financial statements and non-financial information in the prospec-
tus. You must draw the graphs and charts to scale. Any information you
provide must not be misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421. The Note to § 230.421(b) prohibits the use of:
1. Legalistic or overly complex presentations that make the substance of
the disclosure difficult to understand;
2. Vague "boilerplate" explanations that are imprecise and readily subject
to different interpretations;
3. Complex information copied directly from legal documents without any
clear and concise explanation of the provision(s); and
4. Disclosure repeated in different sections of the document that increases
the size of the document but does not enhance the quality of the informa-
tion.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d).
46. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6371-72 (Feb. 6, 1998).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421.
48. See Securities Act Release No. 33-7497.
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and design of the front and back cover pages, the summary, and
the risk factors section."49 Also, the SEC requests that issuers
comply with the six basic principles enumerated in 17 C.F.R. §
230.421(d)(2). 50
I. THE STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
PLAIN ENGLISH DOCTRINE
A. THE STRENGTHS OF THE PLAIN ENGLISH DOCTRINE
1. The Plain English Rule Makes Risks Clear
17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d) requires issuers to use plain English
in the risk factor section. 51 Plain English, rather than legalese
or technical terms, enables lay investors to better understand
the risks of investing in a security. For example, the Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Balanced Growth Fund prospectus, dated
March 12, 2001, describes "principal risk."52 In the section, the
prospectus indicates that "[tihere is no assurance that the Fund
will achieve its investment objective. When you sell Fund
shares, they may be worth less than what you paid for them
and, accordingly, you can lose money investing in this Fund."53
Each sentence in the Morgan Stanley prospectus is short,
uses concrete, everyday words, and active voice.54 The prospec-
tus contains no legal jargon, no wordy sentences, and no multi-
ple negatives, thereby conforming to the principles enumerated
in at least 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (v), and (vi).55 In
this prospectus, subsection (iv), which requires "[t]abular pres-
entation or bullet lists for complex material, whenever possible,"
49. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6371 (Feb. 6, 1998).
50. Id. The SEC requests that issuers "comply substantially with six basic
principles ... when drafting the language in these front parts of the prospectus." Id.
At the same time, as a general caution about writing a prospectus, this release says
"[an issuer] must design the cover page, summary, and risk factors section to make
them easy to read. [An issuer] must format the text and design the document to
highlight important information for investors. The rule permits you to use pictures,
charts, graphics, and other design features to make the prospectus easier to under-
stand." Id.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d).
52. MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER, BALANCED GROWTH FUND 2 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d).
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is used to show the relationship between interest rate and price,
past performance, returns on each class, and the cost of the
fund.56 A reading of the entire "principle risk" section does not
reveal any "legalese" expressions like those used in federal code.
Also, since cautions appear in only one place, investors do not
have to search through the entire prospectus to find all the risk
factors. On the whole, the principles enumerated in 17 C.F.R. §
230.421(d)(2) are useful for making risks clear.
2. The Plain English Rule Promotes Equal Information Sharing
Fundamentally, the SEC believes that the best way to pro-
tect investors is full disclosure to every investor. 57 The prospec-
tus plays an important role in such disclosure. However, even if
the same prospectus is given to every investor, an investor's
ability to read a prospectus and understand what it says will
vary because the investment community includes both lay-
individual investors who have no professional investment ex-
perience and professional investors who are trained to read pro-
spectuses written in technical language. It is, however, difficult
for lay-individual investors to read and understand such com-
plex documents. If issuers continue to write prospectuses using
difficult terms and jargon, lay investors will become increasingly
reluctant to read them. In short, the more difficult a prospectus
becomes, the larger the qualitative difference of information
recognized by each investor becomes. Indeed, a significant rea-
son to create the plain English rule was that many investors
made investment decisions without reading the prospectus. 58
The plain English rule establishes a standard for writing
prospectuses that purports to close the gap of understanding be-
tween lay investors and professional investors. 59 If prospectuses
are written in plain English, theoretically any investor can read
and understand them. The SEC's intent was to ensure that
every investor would have access to the same information before
investing.60
56. See MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER, supra note 52, at 3-6.
57. See Plain English Disclosure Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152 (Jan. 21, 1997).
58. Id. at 3153.
59. Id.
60. Id. (explaining that most written disclosures are too long and complicated
to be of practical use to anyone other than a securities lawyer or expert investor).
20041
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3. The Plain English Rule Helps To Provide Education To
Investors
The plain English rule can help to educate lay investors. 61
Many lay investors lack a substantial amount of knowledge re-
garding finance and investment. 62 Investors should, however,
know about investment targets in financial markets because it
is almost impossible for lay investors to make intelligent in-
vestment decisions without investment knowledge. Specifically
it is important for investors to study "the issuer's financial con-
dition, products and markets, management" and other impor-
tant factors which may affect their investments because these
factors are very important for assessing an investment target's
risk and return.63
A situation in which every investor can read a prospectus
and make an investment decision by himself is best for financial
markets because it places investors on nearly equal footing. 64
Lay investors who make investment decisions without sufficient
knowledge run the risk of buying securities that are overpriced
or worthless.65 Investors, then, may receive significant returns,
but it is also likely that they will lose money.
If lay investors lose substantial sums of money, they may
abandon their ventures in financial markets and deposit their
money in neighborhood banks rather than spend it on high-risk
gambling. This is undesirable not only for lay investors, but
also for financial markets, because the growth of financial mar-
kets will slow without an influx of newcomers into markets. 66
The plain English rule can help to resolve this problem. If a
prospectus is written in understandable language, lay investors
can gather important information about securities and markets.
Hence, in order to create "an informed layman," it is indispen-
sable to write a prospectus in plain language.
61. See Firtel, supra note 17, at 895-96; see also Byers, supra note 9, at 142.
62. See generally Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus.
L.J. 631 (1973).
63. COX ETAL., supra note 2, at 1.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1.
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4. The Plain English Rule Enables Investors To Invest Without
Assistance.
The SEC has opined that where the prospectus is under-
standable, an investor need not necessarily be advised to seek
advice from a financial advisor. The SEC theorizes:
that in the selection of investments from the numerous offerings of this
very intricate merchandise, a simple readable prospectus on one com-
pany will enable the man in the street to make a wise choice between
one company and the thousands of others about which no one may be
telling him anything.
67
It follows from this theory that all investors should be able
to make investments without professional assistance, and each
investor ought to be required to face the consequences of his in-
vestment decisions. Security fraud litigation will thus decrease
because there is no middleman to blame.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PLAIN ENGLISH RULE
1. Complex Concepts May Not Be Clear Even When Using Plain
English
Financial technologies are constantly evolving. For exam-
ple, consider complicated mutual funds. These complicated mu-
tual funds use futures and options transactions for hedging
market risk and for leverage in promoting return; they make
complicated investment decisions assisted by computers and in-
vestment theories using complicated pricing models such as the
Black-Scholes model.68
It is possible that there are no plain English equivalents to
explain such high-tech financial activities. Even if issuers could
explain technical terms using plain English, there is no guaran-
tee that they could explain the financial terms of the future. To
explain complex terms, prospectuses will necessarily have to be-
come lengthy. Even now, for example, Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter uses more than 900 words to explain only two risk fac-
tors: foreign securities and how to make a portfolio. 69 Foreign
67. Kripke, supra note 62, at 633.
68. See Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
69. MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER, MORGAN STANLEY COMPETITIVE EDGE
FUND "BEST IDEAS" PORTFOLIO 2 (2001).
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securities include such factors as stock price volatility, liquida-
tion risk, default risk, and currency risk70-issues which are dif-
ficult to explain in few words.
The SEC insists that the plain English doctrine does not
diminish the amount of information an issuer is required to give
to investors. 71 If this is true, the number of pages in prospec-
tuses will continue to increase as technical jargon increases and
becomes more complex. And the more pages the prospectus has,
the less likely lay investors will read it in its entirety.
2. The Plain English Rule Creates A Double Standard For Lay
Investors And For Professionals
The SEC requires that issuers must "use plain English
principles in the organization, language, and design of the front
and back cover pages, the summary, and the risk factors sec-
tion."72 Accordingly, issuers may ignore the plain English rule
in all other sections of the prospectus. 73
In unrestricted portions of the prospectus, the issuer may
use the usual technical financial terms, 74 thus creating an im-
balance between the amount of information imparted to lay-
individual investors and the amount of information imparted to
professionals. Professional investors are trained, after all, to
read and understand the entire prospectus; lay individual inves-
tors are likely to understand only the parts written in plain
English. The summary and risk factors are not the only infor-
mation that investors should be able to understand in order to
make wise investment decisions. Ideally, the issuer should use
plain English throughout the prospectus, but, in doing so, the
prospectus may become overwhelmingly lengthy. The directive
that the front and back cover pages, the summary, and the risk
factor sections be written in plain English seems to be a com-
promise for bridging the gap between the ideal of the plain Eng-
lish rule and the reality of how much lay investors are willing to
read. However, it seems unfair that the professional investor
can understand all the information while the lay individual in-
vestor may be able to understand only the simplified parts.
70. Id.
71. See Plain English Disclosure Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152, 3155 (Jan. 21, 1997).
72. See Plain English Disclosure Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6371 (Feb. 6, 1998).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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3. The Plain English Rule Robs Lay Investors Of The
Opportunity To Use New Financial Technology
When financial technology becomes too complex to explain
using plain English, issuers are faced with tough decisions. In
such situations, one solution to the problem is to avoid using
such complicated financial technologies for lay-individual inves-
tors and reserve them for professional investors. Indeed, this
tendency may be desirable for lay investors because such high-
level financial technology may include unanticipated high risks.
Avoiding use of complicated financial technologies, however,
robs lay investors of investment opportunities. Even if the high-
level financial technology is too complicated for the current in-
vestment environment, the complication may not always exist in
the future. Some professional investors use new financial tech-
niques when they first emerge, and later their use spreads over
general financial products for individuals. However, this
movement from professionals to individuals may shrink as a re-
sult of the plain English rule because of the possibility that is-
suers will oversimplify and mistranslate new financial tech-
niques. Since this is undesirable for individual investors, new
financial techniques, which could enhance individuals' invest-
ments, may not be used because of the imposition of the plain
English rule.
4. The Plain English Rule May Compromise The "Black-Box"
Technique
If emerging financial technologies become too complicated
to explain using plain English, another alternative is to use a
"Black-Box" technique, whereby explanations of complicated
terms are omitted.7 5 For example, a mutual fund which invests
in several investment options like stocks, bonds, and currency,
makes sophisticated investment decisions assisted by complex
computer calculations. 76 The computer program decides how to
allocate the fund to investment options.7 7 Using sophisticated
75. See, e.g., Interview by John Bollinger, Financial News Network Technical
Analyst, with Lou Mendelssohn, President, Market Technologies Corp. (Sept. 5,
1986), at http://www.day-trading-commodities.com/john-bollinger-library.asp (last
visited Oct. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Mendelssohn Interview].
76. Id.
77. Id. See also FUJI INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CO., LTD, FUJI GLOBAL
BALANCE OPEN 2-3 (June 2003), at http://www.mizuhobank.co.jp/saving/fund/
info/e26311995.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
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mathematical models, the computer decides on the prospect of
each market as well as whether each investment option is over-
valued.7s Since it may be difficult to explain these processes in
plain English, the issuer could limit the explanation as follows:
"[i]n the process of making an investment decision, the fore-
front-computer model chooses the best portfolio." Such an omis-
sion can be referred to as a "Black-Box" omission. Lay-
individual investors may or may not be able to understand such
complicated computer models, even if the prospectus could ex-
plain them in plain English. Additionally, professional inves-
tors may not understand what goes on inside the "Black-Box"
because the explanation of the "Black-Box" mechanism does not
appear in the prospectus. Moreover, once a loophole like the
"Black-Box" option is adopted, such omissions may become ram-
pant. When the prospectus deals with high-level financial
terms, either exceedingly long explanations or excessive omis-
sions are likely to occur.
III. SECURITIES AND FINANCES IN JAPAN
In Japan, the same issue exists regarding how to bridge the
gap between investor understanding and the difficulties of read-
ing prospectuses. 79 In order to resolve this problem, Japan es-
tablished the Law on Sales of Financial Products (LSFP), which
imposes the burden of explaining material information about se-
curities on financial product sellers or broker-dealers. The
LSFP may be a more important tool in investor protection than
the Japanese version of the plain English. This section will dis-
cuss the Japanese regulatory system; the market situation, and
legal mechanisms, including the LSFP, will be discussed.
78. See Mendelssohn Interview, supra note 77.
79. KINYU-CHO KINYU SEIDO SHINGIKAI KINYU BUNKAKAI DAI ICHI BUKAI [THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY OF JAPAN, THE FIRST SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING OF THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM COUNCIL] (Nov. 29, 2001) at http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi-
kinyu/gijirokul kinyu/dail20011129_roku.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter First Subcommittee Meeting].
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A. SECURITIES REGULATORS IN JAPAN
1. The Financial Service Agency
In the United States, the SEC has extensive responsibilities
in the administration of securities regulations.8 0 The SEC's
primary responsibilities include: 1) administering the disclosure
requirements articulated in federal securities laws; 2) oversee-
ing the operation of secondary trading markets; 3) administer-
ing the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act;
and 4) undertaking enforcement actions such as investigations
and prosecutions.8 1 In Japan, the Financial Service Agency
(FSA) is responsible for such activities.8 2 The FSA operates
through four bureaus: the Planning and Coordination Bureau,
the Inspection Bureau, the Supervisory Bureau, and the Execu-
tive Bureau;8 3 it is primarily responsible for policymaking con-
cerning financial systems and the securities market, as well as
inspection and supervision of private-sector financial institu-
tions.8 4
The establishment of the FSA was a complex process. Until
1998, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) carried out administration
of securities regulations.8 5 In the early 1990s, the opinion that
80. See COX ETAL., supra note 2, at 11.
81. Id.
82. FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY PAMPHLET 4
(2002), at http://www.fsa.go.jp/info/infoe/pamphlet-e.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2002)
[hereinafter PAMPHLET].
83. Id.
84. Id. at 4. The FSA is responsible for:
1) planning policymaking concerning financial system,
2) inspection and supervision of banks, securities companies, insurance
companies and other private-sector financial institutions,
3) establishment of rules for trading in securities markets,
4) establishment of business accounting standards and other planning
and policymaking concerning corporate finance,
5) supervision of certified public accountants and audit firms,
6) participation in activities on financial issues of international organiza-
tions and bilateral and multi-lateral financial discussions for furtherance of
internationally harmonious financial administration, and
7) surveillance of compliance of rules governing securities markets.
Id.
85. JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR SECURITIES INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS,
INC., SHOKEN SHIJO 2001 [SECURITIES MARKET 2001] 55 (2000) [hereinafter
SECURITIES MARKET 2001].
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surveillance of financial institutions and planning of financial
systems should be separated from the MOF became wide-
spread.8 6 In 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency was estab-
lished as an external organ of the Cabinet Office (then the
Prime Minister's Office). The responsibilities for inspection and
supervision of financial institutions and securities transactions
were transferred from the MOF to the Financial Supervisory
Agency.8 7
In 2000, the FSA was established as one of the reorganiza-
tions of the Financial Supervisory Agency.88 The FSA took over
the work of the Financial Supervisory Agency, and undertook
the planning of financial systems.8 9 With these reorganizations,
the MOF lost all responsibility regarding securities regulations
and financial system planning except for financial system stabi-
lization planning;90 the FSA became the main agency responsi-
ble for securities regulation. 9'
2. Local Finance Bureaus
A local finance bureau is an external organ of the MOF; its
main responsibilities are oversight of budget execution, observa-
tion of companies' financial situations, and management of na-
tional properties. 92 The FSA also requires local finance bureaus
to inspect securities registration documents and monitor securi-
ties transactions. 93 In fact, securities registration documents
86. SHOKEN TORIHIKI TOU KANsHI IINKAI, SOSHIKI JIMUGAIYOU [THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, ORGANIZATIONS AND
FUNCTIONS], at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/aboutsesc/about-work.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2002).
87. See PAMPHLET, supra note 82. See also THE CABINET OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF
THE CABINET OFFICE: "FORUM FOR KNOWLEDGE" FOR THE CABINET, available at
http://www8.cao.go.jp/naikakufufu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2003). The Cabinet Office
was established as an important pillar of the recent reform of the central govern-
ment ministries and agencies in order to strengthen the Cabinet's functions. The
Cabinet Office's main responsibilities are to: "[assist] the overall strategic functions
of the Cabinet Secretariat, [carry] out planning and overall coordination regarding
key Cabinet policy, and [engage] in administrative work deemed suitable for man-
agement by the Prime Minister from the standpoint of the government as a whole."
Id. The FSA is one of the external organs of the Cabinet Office. Id.
88. See PAMPHLET, supra note 82, at 3.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ZAIMUSHO NO SHIGOTO [RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE], at http://www.mof.go.jp/mof/zaimusyod.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2002).
93. Id.
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are still submitted to local finance bureaus 94 notwithstanding
the fact that local finance bureaus ceased to have primary re-
sponsibility for regulating securities disclosure in 1998. 95
3. The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission
In Japan, the agency for market oversight is the Securities
and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC);96 this agency is
sometimes referred to as the Japanese version of the SEC. 97
The SESC was formally established in July of 1992,98 by which
time the creation of such an agency in Japan was long over-
due.99 In 1991 financial scandals, wherein several major securi-
ties companies compensated their customers for damages from
the bear market, became a social problem. 100 The public de-
manded the establishment of inspections and monitoring sys-
tems over securities brokers and markets. 101 An advisory com-
mittee to the Prime Minister recommended that an inspections
and surveillance commission be established and that the com-
mission be independent from the supervisory function of the
MOF. 102 Based on these recommendations, the SESC was for-
mally established. 10 3 Organizationally, the SESC was within
the MOF at the time of its establishment; now, it is within the
FSA.104
There are significant differences between the SESC and the
SEC. For example, unlike the SEC, the SESC does not have au-
thority to make rules or to prosecute fraudulent transactions.
The SESC can neither make rules, issue no-action letters, nor
94. See Security and Exchange Law, Art. 5-1, translated in INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGULATION, BINDER 4, BOOKLET 2: JAPAN (Robert C. Rosen et al. eds.,
KenTsunematsu (sic) & Shuji Yanese trans., 2000) [hereinafter SEL].
95. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, HISTORY AND
FUNCTIONS (2001), at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc01.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2002) [hereinafter SESC HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS].
96. Id. The SESC is located within the ambit of the FSA. Id.
97. Shokenkensa-"Rule Genshyu" Tokyoku nimo hokosaki [Securities Inspec-
tion: "Strict Observance of Rules" Authorities Also Attacked], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Aug. 11, 2003, at http://bizplus.nikkei.co.jp/colm/colCh.cfm?
i=t-kawahigashi02 (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
98. SESC HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 95.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See SESC HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 95.
104. Id.
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examine securities registration documents, as the SEC does. 105
The SESC can inspect securities companies and survey financial
markets. 106 Based on such inspections, the SESC can only rec-
ommend that the FSA take administrative disciplinary action
against a securities broker for misconduct and file an accusation
with the prosecutor. 107
B. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL
MARKET
The character of Japanese financial markets is changing
from a market designed only for professional investors to a
market including many individual investors; as a result, indi-
vidual investment options are becoming more diverse.'08 In or-
der to keep up with such changes, the FSA of Japan has been
charged with two tasks: developing investor protections and
stimulating financial markets. 109
The Japanese economy experienced a major stock and real
estate boom in the late 1980s with the emergence of the so-
called "bubble economy."110 The balance of trade between the
United States and Japan deteriorated because the dollar was
strong under the Reagan administration.'11 In order to adjust
the imbalance, the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan
introduced the expansion of domestic demands by lowering in-
terest rates, increasing the supply of money, and permitting the
strengthening of the yen. 112 An unparalleled stock boom re-
sulted, caused in part by the events listed above and in part by
low oil prices. 11 3 In 1988, the total trade volume of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE) exceeded that of the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) and for the first time the TSE became the most
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, OUTLINE OF THE PROGRAM FOR STRUCTURAL
REFORM OF SECURITIES MARKETS, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/e20010808
2.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
109. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 54.
110. Although there are a variety of definitions for "bubble economy," it is most
often defined as a situation in which an expanding monetary economy distances it-
self from fundamental economic principles. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Decline of the Nation State and Its Effect on Const. & Int'7 Economic Law: Contribu-
tion: The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble Economy, 18 CARDoZO L. REV. 1053
(1996).
111. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 38, 43.
112. Id. at 31.
113. Id. at 31-32.
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active market in the world.114 In 1989, the total trade volume of
the TSE was 2.431 trillion dollars, the total trade volume of the
NYSE was 1.542 trillion dollars, and the total trade volume of
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was 477 billion dollars. 115
Japan's "bubble economy," however, collapsed in 1990, after
creating a formidable bear stock market. 116 The Nikkei Stock
Average (Nikkei 225), which is a typical index showing move-
ment of the TSE, was 38,130.00 yen in December, 1989, but de-
clined to 15,790.15 yen in August, 1992.117 The TSE lost about
sixty percent of its value in just thirty-two months.
114. Id. at 183. See also TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., SHuYO TORIHIKIJO
HIKAKU TOUKEI [INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL COMPARISON AMONG MAJOR
MARKETS] (2000) [hereinafter STATISTICAL COMPARISON].
115. Id.
116. THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, NENJI KEIZAI HOUKOLU [ANNUAL
REPORT REGARDING ECONOMY] (July 28, 1992), at http://wp.cao.go.jp/zenburn/keizai/
wp-je92/wp-je92-00101.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2002) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT REGARDING ECONOMY]. "The Japanese economy strongly expanded from
1987, but its speed started to be reduced at the end of 1990, and it entered into a
recession process in the latter part of 1991 .. " Id.
117. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NIKKEI STOCK AVERAGE,
at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/FRISERV/nikkeiindexes/nifaq225.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2003).
The Nikkei Stock Average is Japan's most widely watched index of stock
market activity and has been calculated continuously since September 7,
1950. (Before that date, the Tokyo Stock Exchange calculated the Tokyo
Stock Exchange Adjusted Average Stock Price, so index-based measure-
ment of the market actually goes back to May 16, 1949.) The current calcu-
lation method, called the Dow Jones method, has been used since 1950.
The 225 components of the Nikkei Stock Average are among the most ac-
tively traded issues on the first section of the TSE. The index reflects the
ex-rights-adjusted average stock price.
Yen Nikkei225
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This bear market brought financial crisis. 118 Several banks,
loan companies, securities companies and life insurance compa-
nies started to go bankrupt in 1995 because of asset loss and
lagging investment. 119 Citizens rapidly lost trust in the finan-
cial system and a tremendous volume of bad loans jeopardized
other banks including large money center banks; 120 because of
the faltering economy, a number of reforms were imple-
mented. 121 However, many government officers and bank man-
agers believed that the banking problems would resolve them-
selves once the economy started to recover. 122  Thus, the
Japanese government continued to follow the traditional policy
based on a philosophy in which an indirect financial system123 is
superior to a direct financial system 124 and did not research and
implement a reform of the fundamental financial system until
1996.125 The United States and the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, spurred by competition with foreign markets be-
cause of increased investment through telecommunication tech-
nology, had already begun to reform their financial markets
while Japan continued to struggle. 126 Since the differences in
transaction fees and ease of transacting between the TSE and
the NYSE became more marked as a result of these changes,
high-level financial transactions began shifting out of the TSE
into other financial markets. This was due to the fact that bro-
ker-dealers could cut transaction costs and issuers could cut is-
suance costs by leaving the TSE, which remained more expen-
118. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 44-45.
119. Id. at 45.
120. Editorial, MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 6, 2001, at http://www.mainichi.co.jp/
eye/shasetsul200111/06-2.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
121. Brian A. Popper, The Japanese Financial Reform of 1993. Will Reform
Spark Innovation?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 525 (1995).
122. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 45.
123. See id. at 46.
124. See ANNUAL REPORT REGARDING ECONOMY, supra note 116. In the United
States, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a lot of war bonds were issued,
and a bond market that dealt with them was established. Id. Because this devel-
opment of a bond market affected the establishment of the U.S. financial system,
commercial banks did not have an important role in lending money to large compa-
nies. Id. However, in Japan, since the nineteenth century, banks had given long-
term loans to companies. Id. Therefore, bond markets were not established until the
1970s. Id. Because of insufficient development of bond markets and strict regulation
of bond issuance, it was difficult for companies to issue bonds for a long time. Id. As
a result, in Japan, an indirect financial system has been superior to a direct finan-
cial system. Id.
125. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 46.
126. Id.
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sive due to delay in reforming. 127 In 1996, the total trade vol-
ume of the TSE declined to 938 billion dollars; conversely, that
of the NYSE increased to 4.063 trillion dollars, and that of the
LSE increased to 1.389 trillion dollars. 128
In November 1996, Ryutaro Hashimoto, then Prime Minis-
ter of Japan, initiated a financial market reform whose key-
words were "free," "fair," and "global."'129 The Hashimoto ad-
ministration aimed to (i) increase investors' investment options,
(ii) promote competition among financial institutions, (iii) create
an efficient financial market, and (iv) develop fair and transpar-
ent rules. 130 The administration aimed to reform not only the
Japanese securities industry but also banks and the insurance
industry. 131 This was a marked contrast to the United King-
dom, whose reform of financial markets was limited to only the
securities industry. 32
As a result of the aforementioned reforms, financial institu-
tions began to produce many new types of financial products for
companies and individuals; 33 the financial products available to
127. Id.
128. Id.
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129. FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY OF JAPAN, JAPANESE BIG BANG, at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/p_moflenglish/big-bang/ebb37.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2003).
130. Id.
131. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 47.
132. Id.
133. Minoru Komeda, Kinyu Big Bang no Impact: Kigyo, Kakeibumon eno ei-
kyowa doumiruka [The Impact of the Financial Big Bang: How to View the Effect on
Corporations and Household Economic Units], COLUMBUS, at http://www.colum-
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investors became more diversified and complicated. 134 At the
same time, financial products for individuals and discounting of
transaction costs attracted individual investors who had left
Japanese financial markets because of the bear market. 135 The
ratio of individual investors to the total trading volume of the
TSE increased from 15.3% in 1998 to 29.1% in 1999.136 This
was the first increase since the collapse of the "bubble economy."
However, individual investor protection in Japan did not keep
pace with the speed of the reform because deregulation and lib-
eralization were implemented prior to the improvement of in-
vestor protection. 137
Although the diversity and complexity of financial products
had increased, sufficient investor protections were not in place,
and dissonance between broker-dealers and customers in-
creased. 138 The civil code and laws regulating financial institu-
tions were, and are still, insufficient to protect investors against
financial losses because the burden of proof in the civil code is
too high for individual investors. 39 Under the civil code, plain-
tiffs bear the burden of proof of showing a causal relationship
between the damage the plaintiff sustained and the financial
product which the plaintiff has alleged caused the damage. 140
However, in many cases, time and financial constraints limit in-
dividual investors' ability to establish this causal relationship.
The National Assembly, recognizing this problem, passed the
LSFP. Under the LSFP, the courts will presume a causal rela-
tionship between the defendant's misleading explanation and
the plaintiffs financial damages upon a showing that the defen-
dant's explanation of the financial product was, in fact, mislead-
ing.141
http://www.columbus.or.jp/jyohooita/l/4.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
134. See SESC HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 95.
135. Kojintousika Kabushikishijyoni Fukki Net Torihiki Seikyo [Individual In-
vestors Return to the Stock Market: Net Trade Prosperity], ASAHI SHINBUN, July 8,
2003, at http://www.asahi.com/money/kaisetsu/TKY200307080095.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003).
136. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 182.
137. Id. at 54.
138. Id.
139. See THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, KONOHOURITSU DE DoU KAWARUNO
[THE EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON SALES OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS], at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/notice/noticej/kinyuusyouhin-C.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
140. Id. See also Civil Code of Japan, Art. 709.
141. See THE FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY OF JAPAN, THE LAW ON SALES OF
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/rfer/others/lawe/law_
002.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2001) [hereinafter LSFP]. Article 2-1 (xiii) of the LSFP
provides: "[in this law, the "sale of a financial product" shall mean the] conduct
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C. CURRENT REGULATIONS
In Japan, the Security and Exchange Law (SEL) primarily
regulates issuances and exchanges of securities. 142 In 1948, the
SEL was established by merging several existing securities
regulation rules. These rules introduced the following changes:
the disclosure system to issuance markets, the periodic disclo-
sure system to exchange markets, and a rule prohibiting fraudu-
lent transactions in the United States. 143 Most securities regu-
lations are covered by the SEL. The SEL does not define all
detailed rules, but rather commissions the Cabinet Office to set
such rules. 144 The Cabinet Office issues ordinances; the FSA
ensures that these ordinances and the SEL are enforced.145
stipulated by cabinet order as being similar to any of the conduct listed in the above
subparagraphs." Id. Article 5-1 of the LSFP provides:
Where a customer demands compensation from a financial product pro-
vider, etc. pursuant to Article 4, the amount of the compensation payable
shall be presumed to be the amount of the loss of principal that the cus-
tomer has incurred as a result of the failure of the financial product pro-
vider, etc. to explain an important matter.
Id. Article 5-2 of the LSFP provides:
As used in paragraph 5.1, "amount of the loss of principal" shall mean the
amount that results from adding [a] the total amount of money that the
customer (including a third person in the case where the customer in-
structs that a third person is to receive the money or a thing or right other
than money from the sale of a financial product; hereinafter referred to in
this paragraph as "customer, etc.") received or is to receive in the sale of
the financial product (in a case where there is a thing or right other than
money that the customer, etc. received or is to receive from the sale of a fi-
nancial product, the amount that results from adding to said total amount
received, the total amount of the market prices of said things or rights
other than money [if there is no market price, the estimated disposal price])
and [b] the total disposal price of the things or rights other than money
that the customer, etc. acquired in the sale of the financial product and
which the customer, etc. sold or otherwise disposed of, and then subtracting
[c] the total amount of money that the customer paid or is to pay upon the
conclusion of the sale of a financial product (in a case where the customer
transferred or is to transfer a money equivalent upon the conclusion of the
sale of a financial product, the amount that results from adding to said to-
tal amount paid, the total amount of the market prices of said money
equivalents [if there is no market price, the estimated disposal prices]).
Id.; see also THE FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF THE LAW ON
SALES OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 3, available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/refer/others/
law_e/law_001.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2002) [hereinafter OUTLINE OF LSFP].
142. WATARU HORIGUCHI, SHOKENTORIHIKIHO HANDOBUKKU [HANDBOOK OF
THE SECURITY AND EXCHANGE LAW] 3 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter SEL HANDBOOK].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See PAMPHLET, supra note 82, at 4.
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1. Regulations Regarding Prospectuses
In Japan, a prospectus is defined by Article 2-10 of the
SEL. 146 Article 13-1 prescribes when issuers are required to
prepare prospectuses; 147 the "Ministerial Ordinance Concerning
Disclosure with Respect to Specified Securities" (MO) contains
the primary prescriptions for the contents of those prospec-
tuses. 148
146. See SEL, supra note 94, Art. 2-10. Article 2-10 provides:
[T]he term "prospectus" shall mean any document describing the business
of the issuer of securities and the other matters which are prescribed by
MOF which is furnished to the opposite parties for the purpose of the pub-
lic offering or secondary distribution of such securities (other than those
enumerated in Item (2) of Paragraph 1 of Article 4) or the solicitation from
general investors of securities which were directed to qualified institutional
investors as provided in Paragraph 2 of Article 4 (other than those falling
within the category of a secondary distribution of securities).
Id.
147. See SEL, supra note 94, Art. 13-1. Article 13-1 provides:
The issuer of securities subject to the principal provisions of Paragraph 1 or
2 of Article 4 with respect to a public offering or secondary distribution of
such securities shall prepare a prospectus in connection with such public
offering or secondary distribution. The same shall apply to the issuer of se-
curities subject to a secondary distribution (excluding the one whose total
selling price is less than one hundred million yen (V100,000,000) and those
otherwise prescribed by MOF Ordinance) where disclosure is made (being a
situation where disclosure is made as provided in Item (1) of Paragraph 1
of Article 4; hereinafter in this Chapter the same being applicable) (in the
next Paragraph and Paragraph 2 of Article 15 referred to as "securities as
to which disclosure is made").
Id.
148. See Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Disclosure with Respect to Specified
Securities, Art. 10, translated in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra
note 94 [hereinafter MO]. Article 10 of the MO provides that:
The issuer of specified securities intending to file a securities regulation
statement pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the [Se-
curities and Exchange] Law shall prepare the following Items depending on
the classification of the subject specified securities and file the same with
the Director General etc.:
(1) Domestic investment trust certificates - Form 4;
(1-2) Foreign investment trust certificates - Form 4-2;
(2) Beneficial certificates of foreign loans trusts - Form 5;
(3) Domestic asset-backed securities - Form 5-2;
(4) Foreign asset-backed securities - Form 5-3;
(5) Beneficial interests of loans trusts - Form 6; and
(6) Specified depositary receipts - with respect to each class of specified se-
curities relating to the rights represented by the subject specified deposi-
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The MO regulates not only prospectuses, but also securities
registration documents. For example, Article 5-1 of the SEL
provides:
Any issuer who proposes to effect a registration pursuant to the provi-
sion of Paragraph 1 or 2 of the preceding Article [which provides for
registration of public offerings or secondary distributions] shall, if the
issuer is a corporation, file with the Prime Minister, pursuant to the
provision of Cabinet Office Ordinance, a securities regulation docu-
ment containing matters enumerated in the following Items .... 149
Article 10 of the MO delineates the contents of securities
regulation documents and provides the forms which issuers
must use when registering securities. 150 The MO does not regu-
late the contents of prospectuses directly. 151 If, however, issu-
ers provide different information in their prospectuses than in
their securities registration documents, these issuers may be
sued under Article 13-5 of the SEL. 152 Thus prospectuses have
been carbon copies of securities registration documents. Accord-
ingly, until recently, prospectuses have been difficult for lay in-
dividual investors to understand.
There is a new movement to introduce a plain language rule
to mutual fund prospectuses. 153 The FSA amended the MO to
require prospectus issuers to make prospectuses easily under-
standable for lay investors; these amendments were effective as
of April 1, 2002.154 However, the SEL and the MO contain no
detailed rules like 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d), which provides exam-
ples issuers should use when they write prospectuses. The only
existing detailed rules in Japan analogous to the U.S. plain Eng-
lish rule have been issued by the Investment Trust Association,
Japan, an industry group of financial institutions dealing with
investment trusts. 155 These rules, however, are self-regulatory.
tary receipts, the form prescribed by the respective Item depending upon
the class of securities enumerated in the preceding respective Items.
Id.
149. See SEL, supra note 94, at Art. 5-1.
150. See MO, supra note 148, at Art. 10.
151. Id.
152. See SEL, supra note 94, at Art. 13-5.
153. See discussion infra notes 167-89 and accompanying text.
154. THE FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY OF JAPAN, TOKUTEI YUKASHOKEN NO
NAIYO TOU NO KAIJI NI KANSURU NAIKAKUFUREI TOU NO KAISEIAN NO KOHYO NI
TSUITE [ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE DRAFT OF CABINET OFFICE ORDINANCE
CONCERNING DISCLOSURE WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIED SECURITIES] (Dec. 19, 2001),
at http://www.fsa.go.jp/ news/newsj/13/syoukenf-20011219-1.html (last visited Sept.
19, 2003) [hereinafter RELEASE OF DRAFT ORDINANCE PAMPHLET].
155. THE INVESTMENT TRUST ASSOCIATION, JAPAN, MOKUROMISHO NO SAKUSEI
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2. The Law on Sale of Financial Products
Over the last five years, new financial products such as mu-
tual funds, foreign currency deposits, and derivatives have be-
come popular among lay investors in Japan. However, because
of inexperience and insufficient knowledge about these instru-
ments, it is difficult for lay investors to recognize the risks of
such financial products. Moreover, sometimes the broker-
dealers' explanations of the risks of such financial products are
insufficient; as a result, conflicts between the broker-dealers
and investors will occur. 156 The LSFP was established to ad-
dress such conflicts between broker-dealers and investors; it
took effect in April, 2001.157 Article 1 of the LSFP indicates
that:
[t]his law has the purpose of promoting the protection of customers
and thereby contributing to the sound development of the national
economy by prescribing the matters that financial product providers
should explain to customers in the sale, etc., of financial products, by
making financial product providers liable to customers for damages
where the customer is harmed by the financial product provider's fail-
ure to explain such matters, and establishing measures for ensuring
that solicitations made by financial product providers in connection
with the sale of financial products are proper. 
158
According to the outline of the LSFP released by the FSA,
the LSFP addresses two issues: the "clarification of information
provision requirements of financial service providers [broker-
dealers], and liability for damages caused by violation
thereof."159 The LSFP's range extends from deposits and trusts
to insurance products and securities. 160 Broker-dealers who sell
financial products regulated by the LSFP must provide material
information such as "risk (if any) of loss of principal," "potential
causes of loss," "limitation on the period for exercising rights"
and "the period for rescission" to customers, unless the customer
is a professional investor such as a broker-dealer or the cus-
NI ATATTENO GAIDORAIN [GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE CREATION OF
PROSPECTUSES] (2002), available at http://www.toushin.or.jp/info/pubcome2.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2003).
156. KINYU KOUHOU CHUO IINKAI, KINYU SHOUHIN HANBAIHOU [THE CENTRAL
COUNCIL FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES INFORMATION, THE LAW ON SALES OF FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS], at http://www.saveinfo.or.jp/kinyu/hanbai/hanbaiho.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2003).
157. See OUTLINE OF LSFP, supra note 141, at 3.
158. See LSFP, supra note 141, Art. 1.
159. See OUTLINE OF LSFP, supra note 141.
160. Id.
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tomer "has expressed that he/she does not need provision of
such information."'161 If broker-dealers do not give customers
such material information, broker-dealers will be liable for fi-
nancial damages.16 2
The LSFP ensures appropriate solicitation by broker-
dealers. 163 Broker-dealers must publicize a solicitation policy in
order to make sure that broker/dealers promote their financial
products in an appropriate manner. 64
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE RULE TO
JAPAN
Japan established the LSFP, a law the United States does
not have, to bridge the gap between the investor's ability to un-
derstand prospectuses and the convoluted language of such
documents. If Japan had a plain language rule in addition to
the LSFP, how would it affect Japan's investment environment?
A. NEW MOVEMENT TO INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE RULE
There is a movement in Japan to introduce the plain lan-
guage rule into securities regulations. On November 29, 2001,
the Financial System Council (FSC)165 within the Financial Ser-
vice Agency released a report titled "The Study Concerning Im-
provement of the Contents of a Mutual Fund's Prospectus.' ' 166
In this report, the council demonstrated the need to amend the
MO concerning the contents of a prospectus in order to make
161. Id.
162. THE FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF THE BILL ON SALES
OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/p-mof/english/system/fs0O3.htm
(last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See FIRST SUBCOMMITrEE MEETING, supra note 79. The FSC is a research
group that is composed of members from representatives in the private sector and
academic researchers. Id. The Planning and Coordination Bureau of the FSA can
submit deliberations by advisory organs to the FSC. Id. On the other hand, the
FSC can return the result of deliberations from advisory organs. Id.
166. THE FIRST SUBCOMMITTEE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM COUNCIL IN THE
FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY, TOUSHISHINTAKU-MOKUROMISHO NO KISAINAIYO NO
KAIZEN NI TUITENO KANNGAEKATA [THE STUDY CONCERNING IMPROVEMENT OF THE
CONTENTS OF A MUTUAL FUND'S PROSPECTUS] (Nov. 29, 2001), at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi-kinyu/siryou/kinyu/dail/f-20011129a.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2002) [hereinafter PROSPECTUS STUDY].
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mutual fund prospectuses more understandable for investors. 167
In particular, the report indicates how to express the contents of
prospectuses in three concrete ways: a) use of understandable
expression and writing, b) improvement of the arrangement of
the contents, and c) use of graphs and charts. 168 It is apparent
that this study is based on the U.S. plain English rule.
Mutual fund prospectuses became the target of reform be-
cause mutual funds have become an increasingly popular in-
vestment instrument for lay individual investors. 169  After
World War II, the policy of separating banking and securities
businesses, such as the Glass-Steagall Banking Reform Act, was
adapted to the Japanese financial system.170 Previously, only
securities companies could sell mutual funds; banks could not
sell them because of strict regulations. 171 In December 1998, as
part of the financial system reform, the ban on sales of mutual
funds by banks was lifted; almost all banks immediately
launched into the sale of mutual funds. 172 Since the number of
customers and bank branches is much greater than the number
of securities companies, the banks' success in selling these fi-
nancial products exceeded expectations. 173 In fact, the mutual
fund market share of banks was only six and three tenths per-
cent. In 1999; it increased to twenty-two and sixth tenths per-
cent in February 2002.174 Since many bank customers have no
167. Id. at 8.
168. Id. at 2.
169. See id. at 1.
170. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 28.
171. See NOBUYUKI KINOSHITA, KAISEI GINKOU Hou [AMENDED BANKING LAW]
157 (1st ed. 1999).
172. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 49.
173. Id.
174. THE INVESTMENT TRUST ASSOCIATION, JAPAN, TOTAL NET ASSETS OF
INVESTMENT TRUSTS OF CONTRACTUAL TYPE BY DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL (MARKET
VALUE), available at http://www.toushin.or.jp/result/getuji/g6.pdf (last visited Mar.
17, 2002).
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experience investing their money in financial markets, the in-
crease of sales of mutual funds by banks resulted in an increase
of lay-individual investors' indirect participation in financial
markets. Today, mutual funds are an important instrument for
lay-individual investors to enter financial markets in Japan.
However, some critics claim that current prospectuses are
too difficult for individual investors to understand. 175 Cur-
rently, mutual fund prospectuses are so detailed and so compli-
cated that lay-individual investors do not easily understand
them. 176 In order to respond to this criticism, the FSC sug-
gested that the method of writing mutual fund prospectuses
should be amended. 177 Concretely, the FSC suggested MO
amendments concerning disclosure with respect to specified se-
curities. 178 The MO is a general rule; the Investment Trust As-
sociation, Japan (ITAJ) created specific guidelines for writing
mutual fund prospectuses.179
The FSC report reaffirms that securities registration docu-
ments are not necessarily the same as prospectuses word for
word. 80 Until shortly after release of the report, issuers were
required to make the information of securities registration
documents and that of prospectuses exactly alike.' 81 Issuers of-
ten made their prospectuses by simply attaching a cover page to
% Total Net Assets of Investment Trust of Contractual Type by Distribution
Channel
100.0
90.0
80.0 = Securites
70.0 Companies
60.0 - Banks
50.0 Direct
40.0 Marketing
30.0
10.0
0.0
175. See PROSPECTUS STUDY, supra note 166, at 1.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 5.
181. See PROSPECTUS STUDY, supra note 166, at 6.
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the securities registration document. However, lay-individual
investors had difficulty reading such prospectuses because secu-
rities registration documents were originally made only for reg-
istration purposes. Now, because of the shift in the purpose of
the prospectus, material information will likely be carefully ar-
ranged and unimportant information will be omitted from the
current prospectus.
On the basis of the FSC report, the FSA released a draft of
the revised MO on December 19, 2001.182 The amendments aim
to restructure registration forms. In Form 4, which regulates
the contents of security registration documents for mutual
funds, the following sentence has been added as a caution: "Is-
suers are required to create security registration documents in
such a way that investors can easily understand them .... ,,183
This appears to be the implementation of a Japanese plain lan-
guage rule. The amendment took effect on April 1, 2002.184 Ad-
ditionally, the ITAJ drafted and released more detailed guide-
lines regarding how to write mutual fund prospectuses.185
Since April 1, 2002, Japan has had its own plain language
rule for mutual fund prospectuses.1 86 The U.S. plain English
rule and Japan's plain language rule are similar. Application of
the rule will show whether any practical difference exists.
182. See RELEASE OF DRAFT ORDINANCE PAMPHLET, supra note 154.
183. Id. at Form 4.
184. Id.
185. See THE INVESTMENT TRUST ASSOCIATION, JAPAN, MOKUROMISHO NO
SAKUSEI NI ATATTENO GAIDORAIN [GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE CREATION OF
PROSPECTUSES] (2002), at http://www.toushin.or.jp/info/pubcome2.pdf (last visited
Mar. 27, 2002). First, this draft requests that issuer a) use appropriate size paper,
b) use an appropriate size font, c) devise an arrangement of material information, d)
not give the same information repeatedly, e) use a table of contents and an index, f)
use a format of items and subitems, and g) illustrate basic information in security
registration documents with graphs and charts. Id. As for the general caution con-
cerning sentence expression, ITAJ further suggests that issuers a) use simple and
easy expressions, b) make sentences short and not include multiple concepts in one
sentence, c) write concretely and avoid vague expressions, and d) avoid multiple
negatives and no rhetorical questions. Id. As for the general caution concerning
terms, ITAJ suggest that issuers a) use few difficult technical terms as possible, b)
explain such difficult technical terms if they must be used, c) include a general glos-
sary for individual investors in an appendix, and d) standardize the terms used in
the prospectus. Id. As for the general cautions concerning the use of photographs
and illustrations, ITAJ suggests that issuers a) choose the best way to use illustra-
tive information, and b) use such material carefully in order to avoid investor mis-
understanding. As for the general cautions concerning use of graphs and charts,
ITAJ suggests that issuers a) use no misleading expressions, and b) use no layouts
which make the prospectus unreadable. Id.
186. Id. at 5-6.
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B. THE STRENGTHS OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE RULE IN JAPAN
1. The Plain Language Rule Enhances Investor Education
Even if the LSFP protects lay-individual investors by mak-
ing broker/dealers liable for giving unclear material information
to investors, a problem remains as to how to educate these in-
vestors so that they can make investment decisions independ-
ently. Without prospectuses written in plain language, it is dif-
ficult for lay-individual investors to learn about securities and
financial markets by themselves. The plain language rule may
help resolve this issue. Lay-individual investors should be able
to use a prospectus as a textbook on securities and financial
market mechanisms in the same way that the plain English rule
is used in the United States.
Moreover, in Japan, when lay-individual investors cannot
understand a prospectus written in plain language and cannot
obtain material information when financial technology becomes
more complicated, the LSFP provides a remedy: even if lay-
individual investors become "informed-laymen" by reading pro-
spectuses written in plain language, broker-dealers must con-
tinue to provide material information to investors. This is the
safety net and perhaps a more effective solution than merely
adopting a plain language rule. The more complicated financial
technology becomes, the higher the average level of knowledge
required for lay-individual investors becomes. In the future,
plain language may not be able to keep up with developments of
financial products. In Japan, under the LSFP, the duty of bro-
ker-dealers continues, even if the financial products they sell
continue to develop.18 7 The safety net provided by the LSFP can
work efficiently to educate investors as products and material
information about them become increasingly complex.
2. The Japanese Plain Language Rule Gives Fair Consideration
To The Mentality of Japanese Investors
In the United States, one can argue that the plain English
rule will enable all investors to make wise investment decisions
by reading a simply written prospectus. However, such an ex-
pectation is not reasonable in the Japanese investment envi-
ronment because Japanese individual investors are much more
187. See LSFP, supra note 141, Art. 3.
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reluctant to invest in risk assets (such as securities) than U.S.
investors.188 Japanese people own much less stock than Ameri-
cans do; they prefer safety assets because many Japanese indi-
vidual investors have little knowledge or experience with securi-
ties and fear a loss will result from their own decisions. 18 9 Such
a tendency is highlighted by the fact that individual investors'
financial assets have not shifted from safety assets to risk as-
sets, although deposit interest rates are remarkably low.
Will individual investors who tend to avoid investing in risk
assets and have little knowledge and experience become more
motivated to invest in financial markets if prospectuses are
written in plain language? It is unlikely that the plain language
rule alone could do this. If Japan had introduced a plain lan-
guage rule without the LSFP, Japanese individual investors
might feel unprotected because the plain language rule expects
investors to read and understand prospectuses, and make in-
vestment decisions by themselves, which they have been tradi-
tionally unwilling to do. Because the LSFP imposes liability on
broker-dealers for financial losses from broker-dealers' mislead-
ing explanations, as well as for failing to provide material in-
formation to investors, it has paved the way for the application
of the plain language rule as extra protection.
Of course, problems concerning broker-dealers' account-
abilities are likely not the only reason why Japanese investors
prefer safety assets. Several other factors likely keep individual
investors from investing in risk assets, such as lack of individ-
ual investors' knowledge of finance and concerns for market re-
turn in the future. The LSFP does not have the ultimate power
to resolve all problems concerning financial markets, but does
have the ability to resolve some problems concerning disclosure.
In the past several years, individual investors have sur-
passed corporate investors in terms of importance in Japan. In
the early 1990s, many corporations invested a lot of money from
their core business into financial markets because the market
was so strong that they could receive a bigger return than from
their core business in the short term. However, the investment
environment has changed drastically since the collapse of the
"bubble economy." In the stock market, many corporations be-
188. THE BANK OF JAPAN RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT,
SHIKINJUNKAN NO NICHIBEIHIKAKU [COMPARISON OF FLOW OF FUNDS BETWEEN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN 2ND QUARTER, 2003] (Sept. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.boj.or.jp/stat/sj/data/sjhiO32q.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
189. Id.
[Vol. 13:1
PLAIN ENGLISH RULE
gan to sell stock in order to decrease their exposure to stock
market risk. 190 On the other hand, American and European in-
vestors who had sufficient funds from the booming economy in
the middle of the 1990s became a bigger presence in the Tokyo
stock market.19 1 American and European investors could absorb
the impact of significant amounts of stock sold by Japanese cor-
porate investors. However, it will be difficult to continue to ex-
pect American and European investors to support the Japanese
stock market amid the unstable economy of the United States.
When domestic corporations, American investors, and
European investors are reluctant to support the Japanese mar-
ket, individual Japanese investors are expected to act as a last
resort. In the current situation in Japan, it is quite important
for not only market participants, but also the government, to at-
tract individual investors in order to secure financial markets.
The LSFP may transfer some investment risk from individual
investors to broker-dealers by imposing liability on bro-
ker/dealers for financial losses from broker-dealers' misleading
explanations. By doing so, the LSFP encourages individual in-
vestors to invest in financial markets and lends support to Japa-
nese financial markets.
3. The Japanese Plain Language Rule Acts As A
Countermeasure Against The Double Structure Of Prospectuses
Under a plain language rule, prospectuses may have a dou-
ble structure: one part for lay investors and another for profes-
sionals. Because of criticism that too much information pro-
vided in a prospectus confuses individual investors, the
proposed amendment to the MO suggests a double structure for
Form 4, which regulates the contents of security registration
documents for mutual funds. 192 For example, the information
about a brokerage firm which directs the management of such
funds should be shifted to the end of the prospectus because the
FSA does not recognize such information as vital for making in-
vestment decisions. Lay investors may not read the latter part
because the language used is directed toward professional inves-
tors.
Under a plain language rule without the LSFP, if lay-
individual investors suffer damages from not reading the latter
190. See SECURITIES MARKET 2001, supra note 85, at 182.
191. Id.
192. See PROSPECTUS STUDY, supra note 166, at 6.
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part, issuers and sellers will be exempt from liability as long as
the Cabinet Office has accepted the prospectus. Under the
LSFP, even if a double structure for lay investors and for profes-
sional investors is used because of the plain language rule, bro-
ker-dealers may explain information in the latter part of the
prospectus to investors if broker-dealers recognize such informa-
tion as material. For these reasons, the plain language rule to-
gether with the LSFP may be able to provide Japanese lay-
individual investors more complete protection.
CONCLUSION
The Japanese version of the plain language rule, in conjunc-
tion with the LSFP, puts Japanese investors in a stronger posi-
tion than the plain English rule does for U.S. investors. The
plain English rule gives U.S. investors a measure of protection,
but the protection is not perfect. Together with the LSFP,
which gives greater protection to investors by obligating broker-
dealers to explain material information to investors, the plain
language rule can work more efficiently for Japanese investors.
Prospectuses written in plain language may be able to keep up
with the reality of current financial technology, and lay-
individual investors may be able to understand the information
they contain, but in the future this may not be true. Prospec-
tuses may not be able to explain complex mechanisms and risks
in plain language, and lay investors may not be able to keep up
with the development of financial products. If so, alternative
measures must be established.
The LSFP provides some investor protection by requiring
broker-dealers' explanations about material information, and
the plain language rule can work for making prospectuses as
understandable as possible. It would be impossible to bridge the
difference between the lay investors' understanding of invest-
ment instruments and the increasing complexity of developing
financial products only by changing the language of prospec-
tuses. The LSFP is the foundation of investor protection in Ja-
pan, and the value of the Japanese version of the plain language
rule is that it complements the LSFP by giving Japanese lay in-
dividual investors an even wider participation in making their
financial decisions.
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